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Cornhusker Economics
Incentives and Nudges for Environmental Stewardship on Farmland:
A Lab Experiment on the Agglomeration Bonus

Market Report
Livestock and Products,
Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .
Choice Boxed Beef,
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn,
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crops,
Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales,
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
⃰ No Market

Year
Ago

4 Wks
Ago

12-1-17

114.00

125.00

118.00

147.13

181.22

177.43

135.02

171.89

154.80

189.55

206.83

207.08

47.83

60.85

59.20

73.11

78.39

82.66

141.90

142.22

134.53

352.34

381.23

388.43

2.64

3.23

3.26

3.09

3.13

3.12

9.53

8.92

9.10

4.79

5.59

5.51

2.85

2.99

2.74

NA

157.50

67.50

82.50

87.50

65.00

82.50

82.50

107.50

125.50

144.00

42.00

42.00

44.00

*

Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes have an
important role in generating ecosystem services conservation and restoration benefits through adoption of various land uses on private agricultural property. These
policies provide financial compensation to producers
for benefits delivered over and above a baseline level
and for any income losses arising from the land use
change (Hanley et al. 2012). Examples of PES schemes
include the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in the
U. S., the Pago por Servicios Ambientales in Costa Rica
and the Stewardship Schemes in the U. K. to name a
few.
In this research, I study an economic incentive called
the Agglomeration Bonus (AB) (Parkhurst et al. 2002)
which can be employed under a PES scheme to enroll
spatially contiguous land parcels or those within a given
distance of each other under similar land uses. Spatial
coordination of land uses is an important objective because many ecosystem services have strict spatial requirements. For example, biodiversity conservation
may involve creation of critical minimum sized reserves
on adjacent private properties and corridors linking
publicly owned core habitat acres that might require
land use coordination of neighboring producers falling
along the corridor path (Albers et al. 2016). Similarly
water quality improvements can be realized through
spatially coordinated riparian buffer creation. (Lane et
al. 2006).
The AB constitutes a two-part subsidy with a participation component and a bonus payable to neighboring
producers when they coordinate their land uses. This
structure produces a coordination game between neighboring producers with multiple Nash equilibria one of
which is payoff efficient and the other(s) payoff inefficient. Both the general and the AB focused game theoretic literature has focused on mechanisms which can
lead to the payoff efficient equilibrium outcome and
avoid coordination failure.
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ethnicity, color, national origin, gender-identity, sex, pregnancy, disability, sexual orientation,
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.In this research, I study a monetary and non-monetary
mechanism in promoting spatial coordination on the efficient strategy by neighboring producers and improving the
capacity of the AB to achieve coordinated land uses on agricultural landscapes. The monetary mechanism varies the
financial rewards associated with efficient coordination in
different ways and the non-monetary one involves providing participants with information about others’ choices.
This information has no strategic value and is so is a pure
nudge.
I investigate the effectiveness of these two mechanisms with
the help of human subject economic experiments. This
methodology is appropriate because it allows low-cost controlled testing of the AB policy under different conditions
and provides a proof-of-concept before field testing with
producers (Schram 2005). Additionally, implementation of
both mechanisms might require changing legislation and
extra funds both of which will generate costs to society
which legislators may be willing to incur/consider only after
obtaining scientific evidence about the impacts/efficacy of
these mechanisms.
Experimental Design:
I collected data on 144 student subjects recruited from the
undergraduate student population of University of Nebraska-Lincoln. These subjects were randomly distributed between six baseline sessions denoted by OWN-INFO and six
treatment sessions termed OWN-OTHER-INFO. The
OWN-INFO sessions consisted of one group of eight people (total 48 subjects) and the OWN-OTHER-INFO sessions (remaining 96 subjects), comprised of two eightperson groups with participants randomly assigned to each
group. Table 1 presents the experimental design. During
the experiment each group of eight subjects were arranged
around a circular network and played an AB game with
their two neighbors to the left and right. The game consisted of a choice between two strategies T and C with T being
the payoff efficient strategy on which coordination is both
economically and environmentally desirable.

The monetary payoff variation treatment was implemented as a within-subject treatment with three different AB payment magnitudes presented to subjects in a
payoff table. Tables 2a, 2b, and 2c present the different
payment scenarios under which all subjects made decisions. Next, the experiment moved to the informationnudge treatment which was implemented in a betweensubject format. Groups in the OWN-INFO condition
received information about members of their own
group only. In the OWN-OTHER-INFO condition, in
addition to receiving own-group information, subjects
received information about a partner group (and viceversa). For this stage, subjects faced a new AB game
table presented in Table 3. During this stage, subjects
repeatedly interacted with each other for 30 periods.
Finally, subjects participated in an incentivized HoltLaury (2002) risk preference elicitation lottery and a
brief survey after which they were paid in cash. Average
earnings across both treatments was about $22.
Experimental Results:
Table 4 presents the average value of T choices and level of coordination on T choices (measured as number
of triplets of neighbors choosing T) in the network for
each payment scenario. Non-parametric McNamar
tests comparing outcomes across scenarios indicates
that rates of T choice and coordination on T are significantly higher in Scenarios II and III compared to that
in Scenario I. This finding is not surprising if we consider the fact that unlike in Tables 2b and 2c, in Table
2a, the payoff from choosing T when no one else does is
0. Thus, action T has more payoff risk in this setting
and this reduces subjects’ likelihood of making this
choice. Interestingly, levels of coordination are positive
in all scenarios meaning that in its current form the AB
can economically incentivize spatially coordinated land
use although the degree depends upon the magnitude
of payments.

Table 1: Experimental Design
Payoff Variation Treatment
Information Treatment
(Between-Subjects Treatment in Stage 2)

Payoff Order 1

Payoff Order 2

Payoff Order 3

OWN-INFO

2 1-group sessions
(8 subjects per session)

2 1-group sessions
(8 subjects per session)

2 1-group sessions
(8 subjects per session)

OWN-OTHER-INFO

2 2-group sessions
(16 subjects per ses-

2 2-group sessions
(16 subjects per ses-

2 2-group sessions
(16 subjects per session)

Table 2a: Scenario I
Neighbors’ Choices
Your Choice

Both Choose T

One Chooses T & Other C

Both Choose C

Choose T

70

35

0

Choose C

40

50

60

Table 2b: Scenario II
Neighbors’ Choices
Your Choice

Both Choose T

One Chooses T & Other C

Both Choose C

Choose T

70

45

20

Choose C

40

50

60

Table 2c: Scenario III
Neighbors’ Choices
Your Choice

Both Choose T

One Chooses T & Other C

Both Choose C

Choose T

85

45

5

Choose C

40

50

60

Table 3: Payoff Table for Information-Nudge Treatment
Neighbor's Choices
Your Choice

Both Choose T

One Chooses T & Other C

Booth Choose C

Choose T

90

50

10

Choose C

60

70

80

Table 4: Average values (standard deviations in parenthesis) of T Choices and Coordination on T for Monetary Treatment
Monetary Incentive Scenarios
Average T Choices
Average T Coordination

Scenario I

Scenario II

Scenario III

0.65
(0.47)
0.28
(0.45)

0.75
(0.43)
0.41
(0.49)

0.78
(0.41)
0.49
(0.5)

Next, I provide an analysis of the impact of the information
nudge on the likelihood of choosing T and improving coordination rates. Table 5 summarizes data from all periods
and sessions and indicates that the number of T choices and
T coordination rates is higher on average in the OWN-

OTHER-INFO sessions than in the OWN-INFO ones.
Additionally, Figures 1 and 2 present the average outcomes for every period across all sessions. I highlight
two key findings.

Table 5. Average values (standard deviations in parenthesis) of T Choices and Coordination for Information-Nudge Treatment *
Treatment Condition/Group
OWN-INFO
OWNOTHER-INFO

Average
T Choices
0.58
(0.49)

Average T Coordination

0.79
(0.4)

Figure 1: Proportion of T Choices by Information Treatment

Figure 2: Proportion of T Coordination by Information Treatment

0.42
(0.49)
0.7
(0.46)

First in Period 1, when subjects have not received any information feedback about others choices, there is no information treatment effect. Second, figure 2 indicates that
barring the first few periods, average coordination rates of
the OWN-OTHER-INFO groups always remains above
50%. Moreover, there is no significant time trend suggesting that repeated interactions may be reinforcing players’
propensity to continuously choose T given partner group
information. That subjects were paying attention to partner group information is evident from the fact that on a
scale of 0 to 10, the median response for the survey question asking subjects in the OWN-OTHER-INFO condition whether they paid attention to partner-group information was 8. Finally, I conducted random-effects logistic
regression analysis which presented that outcomes are
significantly different in the presence of the informationnudge in addition to being impacted by a subject’s and
their neighbors’ previous actions. Thus, the key result is
that the information nudge is beneficial for incentivizing
spatially coordinated land use actions on the network.
Discussion and Conclusion
This study provides scientific evidence supporting the
effectiveness of the monetary incentive variation and information nudge treatment in incentivizing spatially coordinated land use choice across neighboring properties.
Both mechanisms are attractive but involve tradeoffs.
Higher payoffs will appeal to producers but may not be
permissible owing to policy budget constraints.
Herein, providing information about land use choices of
other producers is appealing as it is an affordable strategy
for the regulator. This is because the regulator already has
that information from past signups which they might be
able to disseminate to producers at relatively low costs to
society. Yet, the manner in which producers will respond
to the regulator sharing this information is unclear. This
suggests the importance of focus groups and one-on-one
interactions to assess producers’ acceptance of the information nudge mechanism. The results of this study, however, provide some key insights about the type of behavior
and policy outcomes to be expected. Of course, the findings are an artifact of the experimental design which is a
stylized representation of interactions between actual producers. While it provides proof-of-concept, results may be
different under different conditions and hence is worthy
of more experimentation.
Finally, it is important to conduct AB focused field experiments to establish external validity of the current findings
rather than extrapolating the findings from the lab to the
field. In the real world, the idea of own and other/partner
community is quite different from that considered in this
experiment where groups of eight people without any

past history of interaction are randomly assigned to a
treatment. Field experiments with producers whose utility depends upon their own actions and the actions and
opinions of neighbors and non-neighboring community
members with whom they have repeatedly interacted for
many time periods will be essential for understanding
the effect of the two mechanisms I study. The combination of lab and field evidence is essential for making the
case for implementing PES schemes with an AB format.
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